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Social power implies responsibility. Yet, power-holders often follow only their own
interests and overlook this responsibility. The present research illuminates how a
previously adopted cognitive focus guides perceived responsibility when a person
receives high (vs. low) power. In three experiments, adopting a cognitive focus on another
person (vs. on the self or taking over another person’s perspective) promoted perceived
responsibility among individuals receiving high (but not low) power in a subsequent
context. This effectwas specific for perceived responsibility – a cognitive focus on another
person did not change the perceived opportunity to pursue goals or the perceived
relationship to an interaction partner (e.g., interpersonal closeness). While prior
research examined how social values (i.e., chronically caring about others) guide
responsibility among those holding power, the current findings highlight that mere
cognitive processes (i.e., situationally focusing attention on others) alter perceived
responsibility among those just about to receive power.
The opportunities to pursue goals resulting from elevated power are usually obvious. Yet,
those holding power are not always aware of the responsibility their position affords. For
instance, power-holders often prioritize their own over others’ interests (see Lammers,
Galinsky, Dubois, & Rucker, 2015), objectify others (Gruenfeld, Inesi, Magee, & Galinsky,
2008), show low concern about others’ suffering (van Kleef et al., 2008), and at times
even treat others aggressively (Fast & Chen, 2009). However, there are also situations in
which power-holders do recognize their responsibility, such as when they attend to
others (Overbeck & Park, 2001; Schmid Mast, Jonas, & Hall, 2009), forgive an insult
(Karremans & Smith, 2010), or distribute work more fairly (Chen, Lee-Chai, & Bargh,
2001), thereby fostering subordinates’ motivation and organizational success (cf. De
Hoogh & Den Hartog, 2008).
But under which conditions do people perceive power to afford responsibility? The
present research proposes that drawing the cognitive focus towards another person
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(rather than the self) will make individuals more aware of the responsibility a subsequent
powerful position affords. We, thereby, seek to contribute to an understanding of the
situational preconditions of construing (i.e., perceiving) a powerful position as
responsibility.
Social power construed as responsibility
Social power means having asymmetric control over one’s own and others’ outcomes
(Fiske & Berdahl, 2007; Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003). This implies that the
powerful can achieve goals relatively independently, whereas powerless people’s
situation rather depends on the power-holders’ actions. Subjectively, individuals can be
more or less aware of two aspects of their power – they can construe a powerful position
as providing opportunities and/or responsibilities. Construing high power as opportunity
implies that power-holders experience freedom and feel enabled to do what they find
important. Individuals are usually well aware of the opportunities (high) power affords;
however, they often tend to overlook the responsibility (for a summary, see Sassenberg,
Ellemers, Scheepers, & Scholl, 2014).
Construing high power as responsibility means to experience an inner drive to take
care of things that others cannot take care of. Due to others’ dependence on the power-
holder, construing power as responsibility signifies considering the others’ situation.
Accordingly, a power-holder may perceivemore responsibility if the other person – his or
her subordinate – is somehow relevant to the power-holder. Indeed, those individuals
who are generally other-oriented, endorsing communal values, do act more responsibly
when given power (compared to a control condition; Chen et al., 2001; see also Co^te
et al., 2011; DeCelles, DeRue, Margolis, & Ceranic, 2012; Gordon & Chen, 2013).
Similarly, individuals holding power treat another person more considerately when
having a strongly committed relationship to the other (compared to a less committed
relation; Karremans & Smith, 2010), when being instructed to ensure others’ well-being
(vs. to boost overall performance; Overbeck & Park, 2006), or when putting themselves
into the shoes of their powerless counterparts (vs. a control condition; Galinsky, Magee,
Rus, Rothman, & Todd, 2014). Similarly, individuals from Eastern cultures, which
emphasize relations to others, aremore likely to see power as responsibility (compared to
Westerners, who tend to value individualistic concerns; Torelli & Shavitt, 2011; Zhong,
Magee, Maddux, & Galinsky, 2006).
Taken together, feelings (or behaviours) indicative of responsibility are raised among
those holding power, if they personally value or care for other people. The current
research aimed to go beyond this in two ways. First, it seeks to show that the extent to
which those in power perceive responsibility does not necessarily depend on their
relationship to others and the value they attach to it (i.e., ‘caring’ for others, such as being
generally concerned about others’ well-being; e.g., Gordon&Chen, 2013); rather, power-
holders’ perceived responsibility may also result frommere attention to and awareness of
others – a situationally activated ‘cognitive focus’ on others (cf. Thompson, Cowan, &
Rosenhan, 1980). People can direct their attention to different aspects in a given situation,
be it the self (e.g., ‘What is happening to me? Howwill my situation change?’) or another
person (e.g., ‘What is happening to others/them? How will their situation change?’).
Focusing attention on other people, rather than the self, has been shown to influence a
number of responses (e.g., it facilitates helping behaviour towards another person;
Thompson et al., 1980; or sympathy towards others, Harth, Kessler, & Leach, 2008).
Because such perceptual tendencies tend to carry over from one situation to the next
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(e.g., Higgins & Chaires, 1980; Landkammer & Sassenberg, 2016; Sassenberg, Moskowitz,
Jacoby, & Hansen, 2007), the focus on others (vs. on the self) might also alter the
outcomes of gaining social power – here, perceived responsibility. Building upon this, we
test whether adopting a cognitive focus on another person – who is unrelated to the
power context – suffices to heighten the perceived responsibility that a subsequent
powerful position provides.
Second, prior research so far outlined predictors of responsibility among people
already holding power – among people who have already developed a certain
understanding of their power. The present research aimed to go beyond this by
examining people receiving a powerful role only later on, in an unrelated setting. It
thereby investigates how a certain meaning of power, namely affording responsibility,
develops in the first place.
We hypothesize that merely focusing attention on another person, rather than on the
self, will promote power as responsibility in a subsequent context. In other words, an
individual receiving high (compared to low) power should feel more responsible after
having adopted a cognitive other (vs. a self)-focus. Note that this effect should be specific
for high power. Low-power positions provide little control over resources that affect
oneself or others; hence, low-power individuals are likely to experience low responsi-
bility, regardless of the cognitive focus they have adopted previously.
Notably, one may expect that responsibility is heightened not only when cognitively
focusing on another person, but also when taking another person’s perspective – putting
oneself into another person’s shoes and imagining what oneself would think in this
person’s situation (Davis, 1983; Galinsky &Moskowitz, 2000). Yet, in situations in which
we have scarce knowledge about others’ actual thoughts, perspective taking requires
intuitions about others’ perspectives – which usually heavily rely on one’s own
perspective. As such, perspective taking implies that (1) the own perspective (i.e., the
self) is activated and projected on the other, but then (2) adjusted to the other person (so-
called automatic egocentric anchoring and effortful adjustment; Epley & Caruso, 2009;
Epley&Waytz, 2010; Nickerson, 1999). In short, when taking over another’s perspective,
the first that comes to mind is information about the self, serving as a starting point. Thus,
perspective taking should render both the self and the other salient, whereas cognitively
focusing on another person implies concentrating only on the other (i.e., without
imagining the self in that same situation, or the relation between self and other; cf.
Thompson et al., 1980). Accordingly, we expected that a cognitive other-focus, more so
than a self-focus and potentially also perspective taking (because the latter also activates
the self to some extent), promotes responsibility among those receiving high power.
Overview of the present research
Three experiments tested this hypothesis, inducing a cognitive other-/self-focus, then
assigning low-/high-power roles, and measuring perceived responsibility in this power
context. In doing so, we were able to test whether adopting an other-/self-focus alters how
individuals construe subsequent power. Experiments 1 and 2 investigated assigned power
roles (Inesi, Botti, Dubois, Rucker, & Galinsky, 2011; Sassenberg, Ellemers, & Scheepers,
2012), and Experiment 3 used a subtle power manipulation (Weick & Guinote, 2010).
Experiment 1 established how other-/self-focus impacts perceived responsibility
when receiving high power. Experiments 2 and 3 then compared this effect for high
versus low power to test whether cognitive focus, indeed, specifically affects individuals
receiving high power. Moreover, Experiment 3 included an additional perspective taking
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condition. Although this was not our main focus in this research, we also sought to
demonstrate that cognitive focus specifically alters perceived responsibility among those
high versus low in power, but not other outcomes – perceived opportunity (Experiments
1–3) and, as indicators of the perceived relationship to one’s powerful/powerless
counterpart, interpersonal closeness to, and objectification of the other (Experiment 2).1
EXPERIMENT 1: COGNITIVE FOCUS AND HIGH-POWER ROLES
Method
This experiment implemented two conditions (Focus: self- vs. other-focus). Seventy-six
undergraduates (55 females, 21males;Mage = 23.37 years; range: 18–39) participated in a
package of three separate studies in exchange for 8€ (approximately $11).
Participants completed a questionnaire of supposedly unrelated materials. They first
recalled apast positive event that they personally (self-focus) or another person they knew
or were acquainted with (other-focus) had experienced. Participants composed an essay
on ‘What happened during this event?’ and ‘What consequences did this event have for
you [for the other person]?’. To give some examples, participants recalled events such as
finishing high school, passing a test, getting an internship, going abroad, or moving to
another city, which had happened either to themselves or to another person, respectively
(e.g., an acquaintance; a family member; a distant or close friend; their partner).2
Afterwards, they indicated their currentmood (six items; e.g., ‘content’; 1 –not at all –
to 9 – completely; a = .82; unaffected by the focus manipulation, t < 1). Up to this point,
the procedure was identical for Experiments 1–3.
Participants then received a high-power role in an unrelated sports scenario (adopted
from Sassenberg et al., 2012), supposedly assessing their spontaneous opinion about
some topics on sports events. They read that theywere the organizer of a big sports event,
who makes central decisions about measures (e.g., implementing mandatory drug tests,
restricting video transmissions, investing money in new performance measurement
techniques) to make the event a success. These measures impacted the athletes and their
preparations (i.e., participants had high power by controlling their outcomes). Partici-
pants engaged in this role by making decisions whether or not they wanted to implement
five such measures (indicating ‘yes’ vs. ‘no’, respectively).
After making these decisions, we assessed their perceived responsibility within the
sports scenario (five items; ‘When making these decisions. . .’ ‘. . .I feel partly responsible
for others’ situation’, ‘. . .I sometimes think about how my decisions impact others’, ‘. . .I
need to take care of others’ needs’, ‘. . .I am concerned about others’ well-being’, and
‘. . .I consider how much I can expect from others’; a = .77) and perceived opportunity
1 For all studies, we predetermined ideal minimum sample size (N = 25 per condition as a standard procedure at that time; this
could not be reached for Experiment 3 as, most likely due to the time of data collection during the semester break, not more
participants could be recruited for this online study), the start/end point of data collection, and report all conditions and main
measures targeting the present research question. Some studies assessed additional exploratory measures, which are available
upon request.
2Note that our instructions did not imply that the other person was personally close to participants; still, some participants here
recalled events of a rather close than more distant other person. Findings from Karremans and Smith (2010) suggest that
closeness to others moderates the effects among those already holding power (in their studies, on interpersonal forgiveness);
accordingly, we tested whether our effects of other-focus differ, depending on the closeness to the other, by coding closeness
(1 = distant other, like acquaintance or friend, 2 = close other, like good friend or partner). Across studies, the effects of other-
focus on (high- and low-power) participants’ perceived responsibility did not differ for those recalling a close versus distant other’s
event. Hence, cognitive focus on another person (independent how close to the participants) seemed to produce the effects. We
thus do not discuss these differences in more detail here.
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while making their decisions as the sports event organizer (five items; ‘I can see what the
possibilities are’, ‘I make use of possibilities to be successful’, ‘I have more possibilities to
reachmygoals’, ‘I can take the control’, and ‘I can followmyown ideas’;a = .78; 1 –not at
all – to 9 – completely; adapted from Scheepers, Ellemers, & Sassenberg, 2013).
Results and discussion
A 2 (Focus: self- vs. other-focus) 9 2 (Construal: perceived responsibility vs. perceived
opportunity) mixed-model analysis of variance with repeated measurement on the last
factor construal showed a significant interaction, F(1, 74) = 6.46, p = .013, g2p = .08. As
predicted, simple comparisons indicated that for perceived responsibility, an other-focus
promoted responsibility (M = 6.99, SD = 1.28), compared to a self-focus (M = 6.36,
SD = 1.12), p = .025, MD (mean difference) = 0.63, 95% CI = (0.08; 1.18). No such
effect was found for perceived opportunity (Mother-focus = 6.29, SD = 1.19;
Mself-focus = 6.63, SD = 1.06), p = .197, MD = 0.34, 95% CI = (0.18; 0.85).3
Providing first evidence for our predictions, adopting an other (vs. self)-focus heightened
the responsibility (but not opportunity) individuals perceived within their subsequent
power role. Experiment 2 sought to test whether this effect is, indeed, specific for high
power. Furthermore, we aimed at demonstrating that cognitive focus specifically alters the
perceived responsibility, but not,more generally, the interpersonal relationship to others in
the subsequent power context (i.e., feeling closer to or objectifying others).
EXPERIMENT 2: COGNITIVE FOCUS ANDHIGH/LOW POWER
Method
This study implemented a2 (Focus: self- vs. other-focus) 9 2 (Power: lowvs. high) design.
Eighty-five undergraduates between the age of 18–30 years (50 females, 35 males;
Mage = 21.92 years) participated in exchange for a candy.
4
3We also explored whether other-focus promotes responsibility independent ofwho is present in the subsequent power context,
or only when power-holders face a subsequent powerless (i.e., subordinate) rather than a powerful target (e.g., a fellow leader).
Experiment 1 thus included target (lower-power target vs. same-power target) as an additional factor. Participants learned their
decisions would either impact the athletes’ preparations (lower-power target;N = 76), as described above, or would be made
with committeemembers (same-power target; an additionalN = 77). A 2 (Focus: self vs. other) 9 2 (Target: lower- vs. same-
power target) ANOVA for perceived responsibility yielded a main effect of focus, F(1, 149) = 4.65, p = .033, g2p = .03.
Other-focus promoted responsibility (M = 6.93, SD = 1.33), compared to self-focus (M = 6.48, SD = 1.19), regardless of
target. Therewas neither amain effect of target nor a Focus 9 Target interaction (Fs < 1). Although the interactionwas far from
significant, focus did not alter responsibility when the target person was also high in power (Mself-focus/same-power target = 6.61,
SD = 1.26; Mother-focus/same-power target = 6.86, SD = 1.39; p = .383), but it did so when the target was lower in power
(Mself-focus/lower-power target = 6.36, SD = 1.12; Mother-focus/lower-power target = 7.00, SD = 1.28; p = .032). There were no
effects on perceived opportunity (Fs < 1.27, ps > .261). As the current research was interested in responsibility towards low-
power others, the data reported for Experiment 1, and the following two experiments, focus only on low-power others.
4 Two additional participants (one from the low-power/self-focus and high-power/other-focus condition each) failing to fulfil the
basic study requirement of being an undergraduate < 30 years, for whom this study was explicitly designed, were excluded;
including these two cases yields similar, slightly weaker results. This study included an additional exploratory, supposedly neutral,
condition; here, participants were asked to describe a healthy diet (i.e., what a healthy diet means, what its consequences are;
perceived responsibility: Mlow power = 5.11, SD = 1.60; Mhigh power = 6.29, SD = 1.17); simple between-cell comparisons
yielded no significant differences of this condition to the self- or other-focus conditions for high or low power, all ps > .337. On the
descriptive level, low-power participants in this condition seemed to perceive a similar amount of responsibility as in the other-focus
condition, rather than the self-focus condition; for high-power participants, perceived responsibility in this condition lay somewhat
in between the self-focus and other-focus condition. Inspection of participants’ essays suggested that, in this supposedly neutral
condition, many had focused on the self (e.g., what a healthy nutritionmeans to them personally), while some focused on others or
on both. Hence, this exploratory condition did not seem an adequate neutral control condition to be included in themain analyses.
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We manipulated other-/self-focus and measured subsequent mood (a = .76; unaf-
fected by the manipulation, F < 1) as in Experiment 1. We then induced high versus low
power following a procedure from Inesi et al. (2011). Participants imaginedworkingwith
an interaction partner in a company. High-power participants imagined being the
manager of a team organizing a company event with their assistants for their company.
Low-power participants enacted an assistant of a team organizing such an eventwith their
manager. They were then asked to complete a couple of ‘regular work tasks’, in fact
comprising some role-matching tasks tomake their high- versus low-power positionmore
realistic; this included checking their office on a floor plan after a move of the company,
checking its interior decoration, and rating its adequateness (here, a spacious, single
manager’s office vs. a small, shared assistant’s office; see Inesi et al., 2011).
With regard to the event to be organized, we then asked them about their ‘expectations
about thecollaborationwith their assistants/manager’, in fact assessingobjectificationof their
assistant/manager (10 items; e.g., ‘I think more about what this person can do for me than
what I can do for him or her’, a = .69; 1 – completely disagree – to 7 – completely agree;
Gruenfeld et al., 2008), interpersonal closeness to the other (one item; IOS scale; Aron,Aron,
&Smollan, 1992), and theperceived responsibility (a = .64) andopportunityof themanager
(a = .66,with the same items as inExperiment 1). Aspowermanipulation check, seven items
assessed how powerful/powerless participants felt within their role (e.g., submissive–
dominant; 9-point scales; a = .81; Smith, Wigboldus, & Dijksterhuis, 2008).
Results and discussion
A 2 (Focus) 9 2 (Power) analysis of variance (ANOVA) yielded a main effect of power on
the power manipulation check, F(1, 81) = 17.65, p < .001, g2p = .18 (Mhigh power =
6.57, SD = 0.99; Mlow power = 5.59, SD = 1.12) and no focus main effect or interaction
(Fs < 2, ps > .17). Hence, subjectively experienced power was unaffected by the focus
manipulation and the power manipulation was successful.
We expected that individuals receiving high (compared to low)powerwould perceive
more responsibility after adopting an other-focus, but not a self-focus. An ANOVA yielded
no main effect of focus (F < 1), but a main effect of power, F(1, 81) = 18.23, p < .001,
g2p = .18, qualified by the predicted Focus 9 Power interaction, F(1, 81) = 4.39,
p = .039, g2p = .05 (see Figure 1 and Table 1). As expected, simple comparisons
Figure 1. Mean perceived responsibility (error bars represent1 standard error) as a function of focus
and power in Experiment 2 (N = 85). Depicted p-values refer to simple comparisons between the two
power conditions, respectively.
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demonstrated that after adopting an other-focus, high-power participants felt more
responsible (M = 6.57, SD = 0.84) than low-power participants (M = 5.13, SD = 0.97), F
(1, 81) = 20.98, p < .001, g2p = .21, MD = 1.44, 95% CI = (0.82; 2.07); this was not the
case after adopting a self-focus (Mhigh power = 5.95, SD = 1.26; Mlow power = 5.46,
SD = 1.06), F(1, 81) = 2.29, p = .134, g2p = .03, MD = 0.49, 95% CI = (0.16; 1.14).
Put differently, focus did not influence perceived responsibility among low-power
(p = .304), but rather among high-power participants (p = .058).
An analogous analysis for perceived opportunity yielded a marginal effect of focus,
F(1, 81) = 3.07, p = .084, g2p = .04 (Mother-focus = 6.30, SD = 1.12; Mself-focus = 6.69,
SD = 0.90), but no other significant effects (Fs < 2, ps < .20). Moreover, objectification
of the interaction partner was unaffected by power, focus, and the interaction
(Mother-focus/low power = 4.33, SD = 0.80; Mother-focus/high power = 4.30, SD = 0.89;
Mself-focus/low power = 4.27, SD = 0.66; Mself-focus/high power = 4.19, SD = 0.99; Fs < 1,
ps < .625). Similarly, interpersonal closeness to the interaction partner was affected by
power, F(1, 81) = 4.90, p = .030, g2p = .06, but not by focus or an interaction between
the two (Mother-focus/low power = 3.22, SD = 1.04;Mother-focus/high power = 3.86, SD = 1.24;
Mself-focus/low power = 3.40, SD = 0.94; Mself-focus/high power = 3.81, SD = 1.12; Fs < 1,
ps > .628).
In sum, after adopting an other-focus (but not a self-focus), people receiving high
power did, indeed, feel more responsible than those receiving lowpower. Put differently,
cognitive focus specifically seemed to affect those receiving high power (but not those
with low power). Importantly, cognitive focus specifically changed how (high vs. low)
power affects felt responsibility, but not perceived opportunities to pursue goals.
Moreover, we found effects of Power 9 Focus neither on objectification nor on
interpersonal closeness to their subsequent interaction partner; this suggests that even
thoughpower-holders becamemore aware of their responsibility than those low inpower
after adopting an other-focus, this did not seem to change the, overall, perceived
relationship to their counterpart. Because we assessed objectification and interpersonal
closeness rather directly, however, future research might seek to replicate this with less
explicit measurements.
Note that Experiments 1 and 2 used well-established, but rather explicit power roles.
To rule out potential demand effects, Experiment 3 implemented subtler power
Table 1. Means (standard deviations) for perceived responsibility as a function of power and cognitive
focus in Experiments 2 and 3 (N = 85 and 89)
Experiment 2 Experiment 3
Other-focus
Low power 5.13 (0.97)a 3.13 (1.69)a
High power 6.57 (0.84)b 5.42 (2.03)b
Self-focus
Low power 5.46 (1.06)a 3.89 (1.43)a
High power 5.95 (1.26)a(b) 4.01 (1.85)a
Perspective taking
Low power – 3.74 (1.88)a
High power – 4.18 (1.55)a(b)
Note. Means with different superscript letters differ from each other in simple between-cell comparisons
at p < .05;meanswith the same superscript letters in brackets differmarginally at p < .10;meanswith the
same superscript letters do not differ significantly at p ≥ .10.
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differences (Fiske & Depret, 1996; Weick & Guinote, 2010). Furthermore, we tested our
more specific hypothesis that power-holders feel more responsible (than the powerless)
when focusing on another person (i.e., attending to what is happening to another
person), similar to or potentially more so than when taking the other’s perspective (i.e.,
imagining oneself in the other person’s situation).
EXPERIMENT 3: COGNITIVE FOCUS, PERSPECTIVE TAKING, ANDA
HIGH- VERSUS LOW-POWER ROLE
Method
We implemented a 3 (Focus: self- vs. other-focus vs. perspective taking) 9 2 (Power: low
vs. high) design. Eighty-nine undergraduates (72 females, 17 males; Mage = 23.34 years;
range: 18–50) participated in an online study for the chance of winning 10€-Amazon-
vouchers.5 Identical to Experiments 1 and 2,wemanipulated cognitive focus and assessed
subsequent mood (a = .79; unaffected by the manipulation, F < 1).
In the additional perspective taking condition, participants recalled another person’s
positive event from this person’s perspective and composed an essay recounting what
had happened and the consequences of the event, as if they were in this person’s
situation (Galinsky&Moskowitz, 2000; Skorinko&Sinclair, 2013; italics highlight central
differences to the other-focus manipulation).
For the subsequent power manipulation (adapted from Weick & Guinote, 2010),
participants saw five products (e.g., a radio, inline skates) with names, ostensibly created
by ‘another participant’ for a contest. Our participants’ task was to evaluate the
innovativeness of each product name. High-power participants learned their evaluation
would be entered into an equation and contribute to 50% of the final evaluation
determining the winner (i.e., participants influenced the ‘other participant’s’ outcome).
Low-powerparticipants read their evaluationwas of interest, butwouldnotdetermine the
winner (i.e., participants did not influence the ‘other participant’s’ outcome). Their own
perceived responsibility and opportunity during this evaluation task were assessed with
the same items as before (a = .70 and .64, respectively). Finally, we measured
interpersonal closeness, as an indicator of the perceived relationship to ‘the other
participant’, as in Experiment 2 (one item; Aron et al., 1992).
Results and discussion
Following procedures from Experiment 2, we tested whether those receiving high
(compared to low) power felt more responsible after adopting an other-focus, but not a
self-focus or potentially taking over the other’s perspective. A 3 (Focus: other- vs. self-
focus vs. perspective taking) 9 2 (Power: high vs. low) ANOVA for perceived
responsibility showed no main effect of focus (F < 1, p = .705), but a main effect of
power, F(1, 83) = 6.59, p = .012, g2p = .07, qualified by the predicted Focus 9 Power
interaction, F(2, 83) = 3.32, p = .041, g2p = .07 (see Figure 2 and Table 1). Supporting
our predictions, simple between-cell comparisons showed that after adopting an other-
5Only data from participants who completed the whole online survey and were unfamiliar with the manipulations were analysed
here; includingN = 19 additional participants with incomplete data or who had participated in similar studies before (i.e., who
were familiar with hypotheses and the purpose of manipulations due to debriefings from previous studies) yields similar, slightly
weaker results.
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focus, high-power participants perceivedmore responsibility (M = 5.42, SD = 2.03) than
low-power participants (M = 3.13, SD = 1.69), F(1, 83) = 12.62, p = .001, g2p = .13,
MD = 2.28, 95% CI = (1.01; 3.56). In contrast, high- and low-power participants’
perceived responsibility did not differ after adopting a self-focus (Mhigh power = 4.01,
SD = 1.85;Mlow power = 3.86, SD = 1.43), F < 1, p = .795,MD = 0.15, 95%CI = (1.02;
1.33) or after taking over the other’s perspective (Mhigh power = 4.18, SD = 1.55;
Mlow power = 3.74, SD = 1.88), F < 1, p = .532,MD = 0.44, 95% CI = (0.96; 1.85). Put
differently, simple comparisons for high-power participants showed that, compared to a
self-focus, an other-focus promoted responsibility (p = .039), whereas perspective taking
did not do so to the same extent (p = .806; perspective taking vs. other-focus: p = .090);
in contrast, cognitive focus did not change low-power participants’ responsibility
(ps > .197).
Analyses for perceived opportunity revealed no significant effects (Fs < 1, ps > .434),
replicating Experiments 1 and 2. Once again, there was neither an effect of focus (F < 1),
nor a Focus 9 Power interaction (F < 1, see Experiment 2), nor a power main effect,
F(1, 83) = 2.20, p = .142, g2p = .03, on interpersonal closeness (indicating that the
unpredicted main effect from Experiment 2 did not replicate here). This suggests that, as
in Experiment 2, focus did not alter the perceived relationship to ‘the other participant’
when given high versus low power.
Taken together, these findings supported our predictions with a subtler power
induction, ruling out potential demand effects. When being other-focused (i.e., simply
focusing attention on another person), power-holders felt more responsible than the
powerless; this was not the case when focusing on the self and, seemingly, also much less
when taking over another person’s perspective (i.e., putting oneself in the other’s shoes).
Meta-analysis of findings across Experiments 1–3
Note that both Experiments 2 and 3 tested the effect of low versus high power on
perceived responsibility in the other- versus self-focus condition. We performed ameta-
analysis on the results for these effects across Experiments 2 and 3 to test the robustness
of our effect on perceived responsibility. To this end, we calculated themean effect size r,
weighed for sample size, for the most critical comparison – here, the effect of high versus
low power in the other-focus and in the self-focus condition. A meta-analysis across these
Figure 2. Mean perceived responsibility (error bars represent1 standard error) as a function of focus
and power in Experiment 3 (N = 89). Depicted p-values refer to simple comparisons between the two
power conditions, respectively.
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two studies found amediumeffect of power onperceived responsibility in the other-focus
condition, r = .282, 95%CI = (0.133; 0.419), but not in the self-focus condition, r = .097,
95% CI = (0.059; 0.248).
Moreover, Experiments 1–3 all implemented a self-focus/high-power and an other-
focus/high-power condition (and different additional conditions across experiments). A
similar meta-analysis for the effect of self-focus/high-power versus other-focus/high-
power condition on perceived responsibility revealed a (small-to-medium) significant
effect across the data of all three studies, r = .242, p = .002, 95%CI = (0.079; 0.393). The
interval of effect sizes herewas very small, .224 < r < .258, indicating that effect sizes for
Experiments 1, 2, and 3 were highly similar. Across our studies, this provides additional
support for the differential effect of adopting focus on another person (rather than on the
self) on perceived responsibility among those that receive high (compared to low) power.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Power affords responsibility to take care of things others cannot take care of (e.g.,
important decisions or others’ interests), although those in power often seem to
overlook this responsibility. Three experiments demonstrated that individuals
receiving high power feel more responsible (than those low in power) after adopting
a cognitive focus on another person (rather than when focusing on the self). In all
studies, other-/self-focus was completely unrelated to the power context, ruling out
potential demand effects.
Cognitive focus affected power-holders’ experienced responsibility (Experiments 1–
3), but did not alter the perceived relationshipwith a subsequent interaction partner, in
terms of the partner’s perceived usefulness (i.e., objectification) or one’s interpersonal
closeness to the partner (Experiments 2 and 3). Notably, our focus manipulation
instructed the recall of positive events, in order to prevent inducing affective reactions
like empathy and compassion with (others’) negative experiences (rather than a mere
cognitive focus on others). While the recall of (others’) positive events may induce some
envy towards others’ successes, our checks on participants’ current mood (unaffected by
self-/other-focus) indicate that this was unlikely the case; yet, future research may
implement a different focusmanipulation to replicate the effectswithout an explicit focus
on positive events. As potential limitation, our studies used rather small samples (see
Footnote 1); future research should, thus, seek to replicate the effects with larger sample
sizes to promote the generalizability of findings.
Our findings relate to prior research indicating that power-holders are often less
responsive to others, for instance, show less motor resonance on the neurological level
when observing others’ actions (Hogeveen, Inzlicht, & Obhi, 2014) or less compassion
when others tell them about their negative experiences (van Kleef et al., 2008). For
instance, in van Kleef et al.’s (2008) study, participants first recalled a personal negative
experience (similar to our self-focus condition, except for the negative valence of the
event), after which their compassion for their interaction partner was assessed in direct
dyadic interactions. Results here indicated that the higher participants’ general sense of
power was, the less compassion they exhibited towards their partner, suggesting that,
similar to our self-focus condition, after recalling a personal experience, power-holders
may not have recognized their responsibility. Similarly, participants recalling a personal
high- versus low-power event (vs. control) subsequently showed less motor resonance to
others’ actions (Hogeveen et al., 2014). Extending these results, our findings suggest that
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when not a self-focus, but rather a focus on another person is induced, power-holders are
likely to better recognize their responsibility.
Furthermore, our findings go beyond previous research in several ways. First, prior
observations showed that responsibility-related tendencies arise when power-holders
generally value others’ well-being (in terms of their cultural background; Torelli &
Shavitt, 2010, 2011; Zhong et al., 2006) or care for others (e.g., in terms of traits; Chen
et al., 2001; Co^te et al., 2011; DeCelles et al., 2012; in terms of independent vs.
interdependent self-construal; Gordon & Chen, 2013; or in terms of relationship
commitment, Karremans & Smith, 2010). Our results indicate that perceived responsi-
bility in power contexts does not necessarily depend on the specific relationship to
another person; instead, these effects of cognitively focusing on another person –
attending to what happens to another person – can likely carry over from one situation to
another, similar to a mindset that can be activated in one context and carries over to
subsequent situations (e.g., Higgins & Chaires, 1980; Sassenberg et al., 2007).
Second, the current studies directly assess construal of power as responsibility,
whereas most previous research focused on (behavioural) results of such a construal of
power (e.g., DeWit, Scheepers, Ellemers, Sassenberg, & Scholl, 2016; Sassenberg et al.,
2012). Combining these two approaches, such as investigating both the construal of
power as responsibility and its subsequent behavioural implications, would be a fruitful
next step. Finally, previous studies indicate how situational factors (e.g., perspective
taking; goals; Galinsky et al., 2014; Overbeck & Park, 2006) promote individualization
and fairness towards others among individuals yielding power (i.e., who have already
developed a specific understanding of their power). These findings support the idea that,
once having power, situationally activated tendencies (e.g., goals) do especially guide
those high in power, more so than those low in power (see Guinote, 2007; Guinote,
Weick, &Cai, 2012). Beyond these approaches, the present research looked at a predictor
of the development of a certain understanding of power, before people possess power in
the first place (cf. Sassenberg et al., 2012). Combined with the previous findings, this
suggests that situational tendencies (here, a cognitive focus) that are activated before
having power may, likewise, guide how people perceive (and potentially enact) power,
outlining fruitful avenues for future research. Beyond this, additional exploration of our
findings speaks to the idea that those high (vs. low) in power react more flexibly,
depending on the specific situation (cf. Guinote, 2007) – here, depending on their
previously adopted cognitive focus.
Note that except in Experiment 3, we consistently compared other-/self-focus. Hence,
the data do not allow for conclusions whether other-focus increases or self-focus
diminishes the effects of high versus low power. Theoretically, both could be the case.
Yet, prior research suggests that usually the self is salient (e.g., Epley & Caruso, 2009;
Flavell, 1977; Nickerson, 1999), especially among power-holders (who show more
egocentrism; see Lammers et al., 2015). This suggests that our effects might be more
likely driven by inducing an other-focus (rather than self-focus); our data from
Experiments 2 and 3 also seem to suggest so, indicating that the high-power–other-
focus condition is the one most clearly differing from all other conditions. Moreover,
Experiment 2 included a perspective taking condition that likely has activated both the
salience of self and other – because putting oneself into another person’s shoes implies
using theown ‘egocentric’ perspective as a starting point and then adjusting it to the other
person (cf. Epley & Caruso, 2009; Epley & Waytz, 2010; Nickerson, 1999). Perspective
taking yielded results more similar to a self-focus than other-focus. Together, this suggests
that the effects may be more likely driven by other-focus than by self-focus. Nonetheless,
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future research might establish this more explicitly with a neutral control condition (e.g.,
lowering the focus on both the self and the other) and test under which conditions
perspective taking may becomemore beneficial (e.g., when taking the perspective of the
very person one has power over; see Galinsky et al., 2014).
In terms of practical implications, the findings are relevant to situations in which
power-holders act on behalf of others without clearly focusing on (these) others. For
instance, many power-holders make important decisions in committees, management
meetings, or advisory boards with other power-holders, but without their powerless
counterparts whowill be impacted by these decisions. According to the present findings,
designing such situations in a way that promotes a focus on and an awareness of others
(rather than the self) may contribute to power-holders’ responsibility (i.e., their concern
for others’ outcomes), which outlines potential ways for practical interventions to be
tested.
To conclude, the present research helps to understand how individuals may be made
aware of the responsibility that a powerful role entails. While prior research examined
individual differences or rather stable aspects of the task or context, the present work
highlights a situational predictor, on the cognitive level, that can be altered before
individuals gain power in the first place. Drawing attention to another person transfers
from one situation to the next, and it helps individuals to recognize the responsibility
implied in a high-power role. This provides a promising starting point for interventions
that draw individuals’ awareness to others, rather than the self, when they will receive a
powerful position.
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